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of the borrower but it is taken in the name of the lender, a constructive
is raised.
In one Washington case7 it was established that the respondent en-
trusted her money to the husband of the appellant's decedent to pay
the remainder of the purchase price of property and to obtain the
deed in her name. The court held that he took title as "trustee" for
the respondent, but did not specify whether resulting or constructive.
While the headnote labels it a resulting trust, it has been cited as an
example of a constructive trust raised to prevent unjust enrichment.'
The case at hand gives no clear indication as to whether the parties
intended that the title be taken in McPhaden's name or in Mading's.
If it could have been found that it was intended that the title be
taken in Mading's name the court could have raised a constructive trust.
If it was to be taken in McPhaden's name, then the resulting trust
seems correct. FRED BRUHN
WILLS AND PROBATE
Objection to Probate of Will at Time of Original Application
for Probate. The Washington court in Gordon v. Seattle-First
National Bank' enlarged the possibility of contesting a will in connec-
tion with the original application for probate. Mabel C. Gordon died
in Seattle on March 1, 1956. Her surviving spouse was appointed
administrator of her estate. Decedent's brother on April 10, 1956, filed
a petition for probate of decedent's alleged will. In his petition he
prayed that the will be admitted to probate, that Seattle-First
National Bank be appointed administrator with will annexed, and
that letters of administration theretofore issued to Mr. Gordon be
revoked.
Decedent's surviving spouse filed objections to the admission of the
will to probate. He alleged that Mrs. Gordon was mentally and
physically incapable of executing a valid will and that she had been
unduly influenced by her brother. He prayed that probate be denied
and, in the alternative, that he, as the surviving spouse, be appointed
executor by preference.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to strike these objections.
The petitioner then filed an answer specifically denying the objector's
7 Banks v. Morse, 17 Wn.2d 18, 134 P.2d 952 (1943).
8 ScoTT oN TRUSTS, § 508.1.
149 Vn.2d 728, 306 P.2d 739 (1957).
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allegations of fraud and undue influence. The trial court, however,
refused to hear any evidence on behalf of the objector pertaining to
these issues and entered an order finding that decedent was compe-
tent and not unduly influenced when she made the will. The order
further admitted the will to probate and appointed Seattle-First
National Bank as administrator c.t.a.
The supreme court reversed and remanded the case on the ground
that the petitioner's allegations of undue influence and mental incom-
petency made the proceeding adversary in character. The supreme
court specifically held that the trial court erred in not exercising its
discretion to hear and determine the issues presented by such allega-
tions.
The decision added a new exception to the basic rule that contests
are to be brought after admission to probate by a proceeding under
RCW 11.24.010 rather than by resisting admission to probate under
RCW 11.20.020. Generally, in the initial hearing brought under RCW
11.20.020, a will is admitted to probate or rejected at an ex parte
hearing without notice. The general rule is that an interested person
hostile to a will should not be permitted to participate in the probate
proceeding. He should proceed rather by way of a will contest, in the
manner provided in RCW 11.24.010.2
The Washington court has previously recognized two types of situa-
tions in which the initial hearing can be made into an adversary pro-
ceeding. First there are cases involving jursidictional questions. In
State ex rel. Brisbin v. Frater,3 the court held that it was error to
exclude evidence at the initial hearing that the decedent at the time
of death was not a resident of King County and left no property
therein. The court, however, had previously misapplied this jurisdic-
tional concept when it held in In re Baldwin's Estate' that proof of the
sanity of the testator at the time of execution of the will was one of
the jurisdictional facts. Strictly speaking, such proof concerns the
legality of the will and not the purisdiction of the court over the sub-
ject matter or the parties, and raises a problem under the contest
statute, RCW 11.24.010.
The second exception recognized by the Washington court involves
cases where two different wills have been presented for probate at
the initial hearing. The court has consistently held that a petition
2 In re Larson's Estate, 187 Wash. 183, 60 P.2d 19 (1936).
3 1 Wn.2d 13, 95 P.2d 27 (1939).
4 13 Wash. 666, 43 Pac. 934 (1896). Although the reasoning is questionable, the
Baldwint case has never been overruled and is presumably the law in Washington today.
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to probate a will may become an adversary proceeding when the court
must choose between two wills in a consolidated hearing.'
Apart from these two exceptions, the court has consistently ruled
that objectors to the probate of a will must bring their objections under
the contest statute RCW 11.24.010 rather than at the initial hearing.
In State ex rel. Stratton v. Tallman,' the state was interested in defeat-
ing the will, because there were no heirs and the estate would escheat
to the state if intestacy were established. The court held that the state
was limited to bringing its action under the predecessor of the present
RCW 11.24.010. A recent case, In re Borman's Estate,7 illustrated
that if the objecting party does not make reference to the issue of
undue influence, nor raise an issue contesting the validity of the will,
it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to adjudicate those issues
in the initial hearing for the admission of the will.
The Gordon case, however, has added a third exception to the gen-
eral rule. The court there said:
Under certain circumstances a hearing upon a petition to probate a will
may become an adversary proceeding.... The circumstances must be
such that either there is a question of the court's jurisdiction to admit
the will to probate, or certain issues are presented which the court
could or should determine at the original hearing. As to the first, the
court is bound to hear the controversy. As to the second, it is a matter
within the sound discretion of the court.8
Obviously the addition of the very general language that the court
has discretion to consider "certain issues" which it "could or should
determine at the original hearing" may open a door of wide but uncer-
tain dimensions. The "certain issues" making it an adversary pro-
ceeding in the Gordon case were undue influence and mental incom-
petency. Thus it may be assumed that these objections can now be
brought and heard in the initial hearings and that Washington has
at least a third exception to the general rule. Beyond this exact situa-
tion, the scope of the phrase "or certain issues" is entirely speculative.
The generality of the language seems to invite further litigation.
In holding that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to
refuse to let the objector contest at the hearing for admission to pro-
bate, the court said, "To relegate the objector to the statutory remedy
1 In re Appleton's Estate, 163 Wash. 632, 2 P.2d 71 (1931) ; In re Ney's Estate, 183
Wash. 503, 48 P.2d 924 (1935); In re Campbell's Estate, 47 Wn.2d 610, 288 P.2d
852 (1955).025 Wash. 295, 65 Pac. 545 (1901).
750 Wn.2d 791, 314 P.2d 617 (1957).
8 49 ,Vn.2d 728 at page 736 (1957)
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of contest could have resulted in delay, not only to the hearing of the
contest, but to an appeal to this court by either party. Conceivably
this could have taken over a year's time."'
This does not appear to be a valid legal or factual basis for enlarging
the scope of the initial proceeding. From a legal standpoint the contest
statute should be exclusive and controlling. If the statutory procedure
is too slow or cumbersome the legislature should be asked to amend
the statute. From a factual standpoint, it is very doubtful if any real
avoidance of delay will result from the decision. A contest based on
lack of mental capacity or undue influence will probably be just as
prolonged and difficult whether it arises on application for probate
or in a contest proceeding. The only delay involved in a contest is
the time necessary to start the contest, to get the case at issue assigned,
and to conduct the trial itself. Similar steps would undoubtedly have
to be taken if the will is resisted on the same grounds when offered
for probate. It appears most improbable that any real gain will result
from the Gordon decision to offset the confusion which may result
from its uncertain dimensions.
Executors and Administrators-Mortgagee's Right to a Defi-
ciency Judgment Against Other Assets of the Estate or Against
the Executor. In Meyer v. Johnson1 the Washington court considered
the question of the right of a mortgagee to get a deficiency judgment
against the unmortgaged assets of an estate. The question arose on
the following facts: The administrator of a decedent's estate bor-
rowed $8,000 and, pursuant to court authorization,2 gave the lender
a note signed individually and as administrator, secured by a mortgage
on certain real property of the estate. The petition for authority to
execute the note and mortgage alleged that the purpose was to enable
the administrator to pay creditors' claims in the amount of $1,732.74
and to protect the interets of the heir of said estate. The adminis-
trator was, himself, the sole heir. After default the lender sued to
enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage. Upon foreclosure sale
the property was bid upon by the lender for $4,924.90. There remained
unpaid a deficiency judgment in the sum of $6,366.38. Prior to the
execution of the note and mortgage and without court authority, the
administrator had first mortgaged and later sold certain other real
9 49 Wn.2d 728 at page 737.
1151 Wash. Dec. 156, 316 P.2d 1090 (1957).
2 151 Wash. Dec. at 159-60.
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property of the estate to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit to quiet title
to this property. The lender intervened in this quiet title action and
the court established his deficiency judgment as a lien against the
property which had been sold to the plaintiff.
The supreme court held that the deficiency judgment could not
be enforced against the plaintiff's property. Said the court:
[O]ur credulity reaches the breaking point when under the phrase 'or
for such other purposes as the court may deem right or proper'3 an
eight thousand dollar mortgage is authorized to pay $1,732.74 of estate
debts with the balance to protect the interest of the heirs of said estate.2
However, the court raised two very controversial questions when it
stated:
A mortgage, of the character held by the intervenors, is essentially
different and decidedly less favorable to the mortgagee than is the ordi-
nary mortgage. The point of differentiation is that there is no possi-
bility of a deficiency judgment against anyone, unless, as here, the
executor, who is the sole heir, signs the note and mortgage in his
individual capacity. (Emphasis by the court.) 3
The first proposition is that no deficiency on an administrator's
secured promissory note can be collected from the unmortgaged assets
of the estate. This proposition was rested entirely upon a Nebraska
case, Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Wolken,' a case which
the Washington court thought was exactly in point with the Meyer
case. The Nebraska case, however, can be distinguished in that it
arose under a Nebraska statute which authorized mortgages by per-
sonal representatives pursuant to court authorization but contained
no provision authorizing the personal representative to execute a note,
as permitted by Washington statute.' The Nebraska case thus is not
squarely in point.
In Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Chapman6 the Wisconsin court reached
the same result as the Washington court did in this case, but pro-
ceeded on an entirely different theory. The Wisconsin court distin-
guished between the executor's rights and duties in handling realty
and personalty.7 The Wisconsin court, however, failed to cite any
cases that would justify such a distinction.
3 151 Wash. Dec. at 161.
4 146 Neb. 684, 21 N.V.2d 418 (1946).
5RCW 11.56.040.
6121 Wis. 479, 99 N.V. 341 (1904).
799 N.W.2d at 344. The court said: "As to the personalty, he was the owner, and
held the title for the beneficial interest of the creditors and heirs. In dealing with it
1958]
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It would seem that the Washington court could have reached the
same result on what would appear to be a more proper and logical
route. The contracts or other post-mortem obligations of a personal
representative never bind the estate as an original obligor. A creditor
of a personal representative never has a direct claim against the estate,
but only a claim against the executor or administrator personally, plus
a right to be subrogated to the administrator's or executor's right to
reimbursement. The executor or administrator is entitled to be reim-
bursed from unmortgaged assets for the amount of a deficiency judg-
ment only if the moneys represented by such deficiency judgment were
borrowed and used for reasonable and proper expenditures for the
estate.
The effect of the rule can be illustrated by a previous Washington
case, Jones v. Peabody,' where the court stated:
Where, however, the representatives of the estate, in this case the
executors, are insolvent, in the sense that they could not pay the judg-
ment against them for attorneys' fees, an action may be brought against
them and after judgment obtained the plaintiffs be subrogated to their
right to be compensated out of the estate.
Under this theory the holder of the personal representative's note in
the principal case should have been able to collect the deficiency from
the estate assets by a derivative proceeding if voluntary payment
thereof could have been justified as a proper and necessary act of
the personal representative.
Applying these principles the Washington court should have stated
that the estate assets can be reached through the rights of the per-
sonal representative with respect to all obligations properly incurred
by him unless the statute specifically provides that such assets are
not liable for such obligations. There is nothing in the Washington
probate mortgage statute to indicate that the holder of the personal
representative's secured promissory note should receive less favorable
he acts voluntarily as the owner, and solely in his personal capacity. In such transac-
tion he represents no principal, and upon well-established rules he assumed all liabilities
personal in character, relying upon his lien for indemnity out of the estate for expenses
and liabilities incurred in a proper administration of his trust. In the disposition of
real estate his duties are imposed by law and directed by the court, under the authority
of the statute, and can be carried out only in the prescribed manner. He has no
interest in, or control over the property, except as he executes the mandates of the
court to enforce creditors' claims against the decedent's real estate. These grounds
have been held to furnish the distinction between the administrator's liability in his
personal and representative capacities in performing his duties as administrator of
the estate."
8 182 Wash. 148, 151, 45 P.2d 915 (1935).
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treatment than that accorded to the holder of an unsecured note, or
any other type of general creditor of the personal representative. This
rule would not alter the result in this case because the deficiency here
represented money borrowed for expenses which the administrator
could not properly charge against the estate. Therefore, in this case
the judgment creditor could not assert a derivative right against the
other assets of the estate.
The second proposition of the court is the dictum that no deficiency
judgment can be collected from anyone unless the personal repre-
sentative signs in his individual capacity. This statement oversimpli-
fies a rather complex problem.9 It is doubtful that it represents an
established rule. What the court means is that a note signed "X, as
administrator of the estate of Y" binds nothing but the mortgaged
property; but that if the note is signed "X, individually and as admin-
istrator of the estate of Y," the obligation extends to the private
resources of X as well as to the mortgaged property. There are authori-
ties which would establish the personal liability of X under the first
as well as under the second type of signature." A persuasive argument
can be made for the rule that the personal representative is personally
liable unless he clearly stipulates that the creditors will not hold him
liable beyond his ability to obtain reimbursement from the estate."
The rationalization that is often made for the nonliability of an agent
in these signature cases cannot be made for a personal representative.
Like a trustee the personal representative has no principal. He is the
only possible obligor, and the agency argument that the agent should
not be liable because it was his intent to contract only on behalf of a
principal is not available to an executor, administrator or trustee who
has no principal. The normal presumption as to a personal representa-
tive or trustee therefore is that he has contracted to be personally
liable and will rely on the estate assets for reimbursement.
These rules provide a built-in check on fraudulent transactions in
that both the administrator and the mortgagee would know that they
can only recover reasonable expenses from the estate. The rule of this
9 ATKINSON, WILLs 650-656 (1953) ; Anno. Personal liability of trustee, executor,
administrator, or guardian, as affected by terms or form of signature. 138 A.L.R. 155(1942).(1 Call v. Garland, 124 Me. 27, 125 At. 225 (1924) ; Pointer v. Farmers' Fertilizer
Co., 230 Ala. 87, 160 So. 252 (1935) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Parks, 42 Ga. App. 482, 156
S.E. 471 (1931).11 East River Savings Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284 N.Y. 470, 31 N.E.2d 906
(1940) ; Jones Brewing Co. v. Flatherty, 80 N.H. 571, 120 At. 432 (1923) ; Heisler v.
Nole, 84 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1948).
1958]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
case, that no deficiency judgment can be collected from other estate
assets, may well be practically undesirable. Its effect may make it
inconvenient and even impossible for the personal representative to
borrow in a lender's market unless excessive security is given. The
rule simply invites lenders in a tight money market to insist on more
than the usual amount of security to assure that there will be no defi-
ciency judgment. Its effect may be to put an undesirable added
burden on a personal representative who needs to borrow money to
preserve and maintain an estate. WILIAm ROETCISOENDER
Power and Right of a Devisee to Convey and Encumber Real Estate. A recent
Washington case, Kerns v. Pickett, 49 Wn.2d 770, 306 P.2d 1112 (1957), brought out
a rather interesting point of law. The devisee under a will executed a five-year lease
of the devised real estate. This lease instrument was executed four months prior to
submission of the will for probate and was never approved or ratified by the executor.
The devisee-lessor sought to avoid the lease on the ground that she had no power or
right to convey her life estate in a one-half undivided community interest in the farm
lands without the express written approval of the executors of her husband's will. The
trial court rejected this and other arguments and enjoined the devisee-lessor and other
parties from interfering with the lease.
On appeal the supreme court sustained the trial court's judgment and stated that
there was no merit in the contention that the lease was invalid because the executors
were not parties to it or because it was executed by the devisee without proper
authorization or approval of the executors. The supreme court declared that the
power of an executor to manage and control the real property of the estate is not
necessarily inconsistent with and does not override the power and the right of a devisee
to encumber or convey his interest in real property. Under RCW 11.04.250 the title
to realty vests immediately in an heir subject to the payment of the debts, expenses
and charges against the estate.
Since in this case there were no creditors whose rights were in any way involved,
the court properly rejected the devisee's argument that the lease was invalid. It is
submitted, however, that in a case involving creditors the personal representative
could avoid or postpone the lease under the authority granted him under RCW
11.48.020 which provides:
Every executor or administrator shall ... have a right to the immediate possession
of all the real as well as personal estate of the deceased, and may receive the rents
and profits of the real estate until the estate shall be settled or delivered over, by
order of the court, to the heirs, or devisees,...
Executors and Adminstrators-Creditors' Rights Against Property in the Hands
of a Special Administrator. A recent Washington case, Peterson v. Johnson, 49 Wn.2d
869, 307 P.2d 564 (1957), involved the following issue: may the vendor of personal
property sold on a conditional sales contract maintain a replevin action against a
special administrator in possession thereof, the deceased vendee having defaulted in
his payments, when the vendor had not, prior to the vendee's death, declared his inten-
tion to forfeit the vendee's rights under the contract and had not taken any legal steps
to terminate the contract before the death of the vendee?
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the vendor's complaint on the ground that
the special administrator could not be sued by a creditor of the deceased by reason
of the last part of RCW 11.32.050, which reads:
[SUMAER
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Such special administrator shall not be liable to an action by any creditor of the
deceased, and the time for limitation of all suits against the estate shall begin to
run from the time of granting letters testamentary or of administration in the
usual form, in like manner as if such special administration had not been granted.
The supreme court held that the trial court was correct in sustaining respondent's
demurrer to the complaint, and affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the com-
plaint. The case is consistent with two previous Washington cases: In re Hohn's
Estate, 141 Wash. 475, 252 Pac. 145 (1927), and Ward v. Magaha, 71 Wash. 679, 129
Pac. 395 (1913), which both held that a special administrator has no power to exer-
cise the powers and duties conferred upon a regular administrator, such as the allow-
ance of claims. The cases all emphasize the fact that a special administrator is author-
ized to do little other than collect and preserve the effects of the deceased pending
appointment of a personal representative.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Longshoremen's Act-Right to Sue Fellow Employees. Can an
employee covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Com-
pensation Act' sue his fellow employee? The Washington Supreme
Court in Ginnis v. Southerland' has said no. In that case a longshore-
man, injured while working on the S.S. Santa Anita, owned by the
Grace Lines, Inc., elected to sue the master of the vessel rather than
receive compensation under the act. Southerland, the master, did
not deny his alleged personal negligence but raised the defense that he
was an agent of the Grace Lines, Inc., which was also the employer of
the injured workman. He claimed that since his employer was immune
under the compensation act,3 he, as agent, shared the Grace Lines'
immunity. The court held that the acts of the agent were the acts of
the employer because he acted through his employer." Thus, the
master was not a third person under section 933 of the act,5 which
permits the workman to sue "some person other than the employer."
Therefore, the master was necessarily excluded from liability by sec-
tion 905,' which states that the liability of the employer under the
144 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 901-950 (1952).
2 50 Wn.2d 557, 313 P.2d 675 (1957).
344 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 905 (1952). "The liability of an employer pre-
scribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee, his legal representative....
4 Ginnis v. Southerland, 50 Wn.2d at 558, 313 P.2d 675 (1957): "The privity
between principal and agent is expressed in the ancient maxim qui facit per alium facit
per se. Therefore, the master's negligent act was the act of the Grace Lines, Inc., and
appellants were not injured by the act of some person other than the employer."
544 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 933a (1952). "If on account of a disability or
death for which compensation is payable under this chapter the person entitled to such
compensation determines that some person other than the employer is liable in damages,
he may elect, by giving notice to the deputy commissioner in such manner as the
Secretary may provide, to receive such compensation or to recover damages against
such third persons."
6 Note 3 supra.
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